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Heterogeneity in the Speed of Adjustment to Target Leverage: A UK Study
J. Fitzgeralda,, J. Ryanb and S. Killianc

Abstract
Responding to the need to address heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA) to target
leverage in a manner that reflects the fractional nature of leverage, we estimate SOAs across
sub-samples of UK firms using the Dynamic Panel Fractional estimator (DPF). Using firm
risk as a categorising variable, we show that riskier firms tend to adjust to target leverage at a
faster rate, suggesting opportunity costs of being away from target leverage are higher for
riskier firms. We also demonstrate the bias in SOAs as estimated using a model that does not
account for the fractional nature of leverage, and show that this bias can result in spurious
inferences being made when comparing SOAs across sub-samples. Our results cast doubt on
existing evidence relating to heterogeneity in SOAs of UK firms.

a

College of Business, School of Accounting and Finance, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin 2, Ireland
Corresponding author. E-mail: james.fitzgerald@dit.ie
b
Kemmy Business School, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland.
Email:James.Ryan@ul.ie
c
Kemmy Business School, Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland.
Email: Sheila.Killian@ul.ie


I.

Introduction

Since Modigliani and Miller postulated their capital structure irrelevancy theorem in 1958,
extensive research has been conducted on the relevance of capital structure to firm value.
Principal among the competing theories that have emerged are the trade-off theory, pecking
order theory and market timing theory, and research in the area of capital structure has
focused on assessing the validity of these theories. One testing method commonly adopted is
to employ a dynamic partial adjustment model to test for the existence of a target leverage
ratio which firms actively adjust towards, and to estimate the speed at which adjustment takes
place. Evidence indicating speedy adjustment to target leverage would provide support for
the trade-off theory over its leading competitor, as its core hypothesis states that each firm
has a unique optimal capital structure at which its cost of capital is minimised and firm value
is maximised. Results of studies adopting this approach almost unanimously conclude that
firms make financing decisions with adjustment towards a target capital structure in mind,
suggesting the trade-off theory plays a significant role in explaining capital structure
decisions.
However, there are two reasons why the manner in which this approach is commonly
adopted may be problematic. First, there is a growing consensus that the factors motivating
firms’ financing decisions are not homogenous across firms (Beattie et al., 2006; Frank and
Goyal, 2009; Graham and Leary, 2011), and so any speed of adjustment estimated using a
large aggregated sample of firm-year observations fails to take this heterogeneity into
account. Thus, although a comparison of results across these studies suggests firms actively
adjust to target leverage ratios, the speeds of adjustment estimated only indicate the
importance to the “average” firm of achieving target leverage. Second, the dynamic partial
adjustment model involves regressing current actual leverage ratios on lagged actual leverage
ratios, with the coefficient on lagged actual leverage implying the speed of adjustment (SOA)
to target leverage. However, the methods commonly employed to estimate this model ignore
or do not fully account for the censored nature of the leverage ratio. Leverage ratios can only
take values from 0 to 1, and thus methodologies that don’t take the fractional nature of
leverage ratios into account will produce biased estimates of the speed of adjustment (Elsas
and Florysiak, 2011).
Following on from the work of Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and Drobetz et al (2015),
this study responds to these issues by estimating the Dynamic Panel Fractional (DPF)
estimator on sub-samples of UK firm-year observations across which theory and empirical

evidence suggest speeds of adjustment are likely to vary. Our results show that the DPF
estimator implies a faster average SOA (27.9%) as compared to that implied by the BlundellBond (2008) estimator (20.9%), a finding consistent with that of Drobetz et al (2015). This
indicates that prior reported UK average adjustment speeds estimated using the BlundellBond (BB) estimator may not represent the true leverage targeting behaviour of the “average”
UK firm. Furthermore, when we split our sample into sub-samples based on risk, the results
produced by the DPF estimator indicate that riskier firms exhibit faster SOAs, suggesting
opportunity costs of being away from target leverage are higher for riskier firms. These
findings are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015). However, these
differences in the SOAs across the risk sub-samples are smaller in magnitude than those
implied by the BB estimator, and thus question the heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms as
reported by prior studies employing the BB estimator.
This study makes two key contributions to the capital structure literature. First, to the
best of our knowledge we are the first study to examine heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK
firms using the DPF estimator. Although Drobetz et al (2015) estimate the SOA of the
average UK firm using the DPF estimator, any results presented in relation to sub-samples
are based on sub-samples of firms across the G7 countries, and thus heterogeneity of SOAs
specifically within the UK is not addressed. Second, by comparing the heterogeneity in SOAs
across the DPF and BB estimators using three different sub-sampling methods, we extend the
work of Elsas and Florysiak (2015) who compare heterogeneity in SOAs across DPF and BB
estimators using sub-samples of US firms based on credit ratings alone.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the extant
literature relating to dynamic partial adjustment models. Section III outlines the salient
features of our data and methodology. Section IV discusses the results of the DPF and BB
estimators and section V concludes.

II.

Literature Review

Over the last half century, the capital structure literature has focused on forming theories that
can explain observed variation in firms’ capital structures, and subsequently assessing the
validity of these theories via econometric tests of their empirical predictions. Many different
methodological approaches have been adopted to test these predictions, resulting in evidence
being found in favour of and against each theory. One approach that has come to dominate

recent empirical studies is the dynamic partial adjustment model. This model assesses
whether or not firms financing decisions are motivated by a desire to achieve a target
leverage ratio, and estimates the speed at which adjustment to this target occurs. Evidence
indicating such behaviour would provide support for the explanatory power of the trade-off
theory, as it hypothesises that each firm has an optimal capital structure, that if achieved, will
minimise cost of capital and maximise firm value. Moreover, such evidence would also raise
doubt as to the validity of the pecking order theory and market timing theory, as both theories
imply a firm’s capital structure is the accumulation of a series of historical financing
decisions that have not been aimed at achieving a target leverage ratio. Thus, the dynamic
partial adjustment model is often employed as a test of the trade-off theory versus competing
theories, with results invariably indicating firms actively adjust to a target leverage ratio.
However, two issues with the manner in which this approach is commonly employed have
been identified, suggesting a more nuanced approach is required if it is to be fit for purpose.

Conditionality of Factors
There is a growing consensus that the factors affecting firms’ capital structures are not
homogenous across firms, but are conditional on firm characteristics (Frank and Goyal,
2009), economic circumstances (Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006) and market setting
(Antoniou et al, 2008). This conditionality implies that dynamic partial adjustment models
estimated using large aggregated samples of firm-year observations may result in spurious
inferences being made as to the relative explanatory powers of capital structure theories. The
“average” firm may be seen to adjust to target leverage ratios, but the speed of adjustment
(SOA) to target leverage might vary significantly across sub-samples of firms. Thus, it may
be the case that for some firms, closing the gap between actual and target leverage may be of
second order importance to considerations consistent with the pecking order theory or market
timing theory, but this would be unidentified or understated if large aggregated samples are
employed.
In an attempt to account for this potential heterogeneity in leverage targeting
behaviour, a number of studies estimate SOAs for sub-samples of firms across which the
benefits and costs of achieving target leverage, or the ability to do so, are likely to differ.
Oztekin (2015) conducts a cross country comparison of SOAs, where countries are
characterised by the quality of their legal and financial institutions. The study finds that in
countries with high quality institutions firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds, as the costs of
adjustment are lower and firms have better access to capital markets. Using US data, Liao et

al (2015) assess the role of corporate governance on firms’ SOAs. The results show that firms
with better corporate governance practices have higher target leverage ratios and adjust faster
to these targets, whilst firms with entrenched management tend to have lower target leverage
ratios and exhibit slower adjustment speeds. Estimating the cost of deviation from target
leverage via its effect on the cost of equity, Zhou et al (2016) investigate SOAs across subsamples that differ in terms of the sensitivity of the cost of equity to deviation from target
leverage. Their findings indicate that firms whose cost of equity is highly sensitive to
deviations from target tend to have higher SOAs, with the effect being more pronounce when
firms are above their target leverage rather than below.

Fractional Nature of Leverage
The dynamic partial adjustment model involves regressing firms’ current leverage ratios on
lagged leverage ratios and an estimate of the target leverage ratio. A statistically significant
coefficient for the lagged leverage ratio indicates firms’ actively adjust to target leverage,
whilst the magnitude of the coefficient implies the SOA. A number of econometric methods
have been employed to estimate such a model, where issues relating to unobserved firm
fixed-effects, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable, and
the unbalanced nature of panels can be adequately addressed (Drobetz et al, 2015). However,
one issue that continuously fails to be addressed is the fractional nature of leverage.
By definition, a firm’s leverage ratio is bounded between 0 and 1. However, standard
estimators used to measure SOA fail to take this into account, resulting in SOA estimates that
may be severely biased due to mechanical mean reversion (Chang and Disgupta, 2009).
Furthermore, easy work-arounds often used to reduce this bias, such as dropping all
observations with zero leverage, or observations with values of leverage below 0.1 and above
0.9, fail to adequately account for the impact of the bounded leverage ratio (Elsas and
Florysiak, 2015). To address this issue of mechanical mean reversion, Elsas and Florysiak
(2011) develop a doubly censored Tobit estimator, referred to as the Dynamic Panel
Fractional (DPF) estimator, which can be applied to unbalanced panel data where the lagged
dependent variable is included as an explanatory variable and unobserved firm fixed effects
are present. They demonstrate that not only is the estimator robust to mechanical mean
reversion, it can identify zero SOAs when changes in leverage are random, and is the only
estimator that should be employed when comparing SOAs across sub-samples.

III.

Data and Methodology

Building on the work of Elsas and Florysiak (2011) and Drobetz et al (2015), this study
investigates heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms by applying the DPF estimator to subsamples of firms across which the opportunity cost of deviation from target leverage is
expected to differ.

Data
Our sample is sourced from DataStream, and is comprised of UK listed firms for which
relevant data is available between 1/7/1995 and 30/06/2016. Following almost all studies on
capital structure, financial institutions are excluded, and to minimise the effect of outliers, all
variables are winsorised at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions. Observations with
negative values of book value of equity are dropped, whilst firms must have a minimum of
three consecutive observations to be included in the sample. The final dataset is an
unbalanced panel of 18,337 firm-year observations, 3,531 of which have zero debt.

Variables
We employ 7 independent variables which collectively proxy for a firm’s target leverage
ratio. These variables are firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, market-to-book, capital
expenditure, research and development, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not
research and development costs are reported in the income statement. We measure our
leverage ratios in book values only, prompted by Beattie et al. (2006) who find that 83% of
UK Finance directors who measure financial gearing do so using book values. Table 1
provides definitions of the dependent and independent variables employed, table 2 presents
descriptive statistics for all variables and table 3 presents univariate correlation coefficients
between each pair of variables.

Variable
Leverage
tdta
Firm Size
lnta
Asset Tangibility
tang
Profitability
roa
Market-to-Book
mtb
Capital Expenditure
capexta
Research and Development
resdev
R&D Dummy
resdevdum

Table 1: Variable Definitions
Definition and Notes
The ratio of total debt to total assets.
The natural log of total assets.
The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets.
The ratio of EBIT to total assets
The ratio of market value ordinary shares + total debt + book
value preference shares to total assets
The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets
The ratio of research and development expenditure to total
assets
A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when a firm reports
research and development expenditure and 0 otherwise
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

tdta
lnta
tang
roa
mtb
capexta
resdev
resdevdum

Minimum

Maximum

Median

Mean

0
6.4409
0
-1.5770
0.2269
0
0
0

0.6300
16.1885
0.9296
0.3524
12.6277
0.3224
0.4677
1

0.1118
10.6067
0.1595
0.0556
1.0704
0.0285
0
0

0.1511
10.7696
0.2485
-0.0258
1.6749
0.0477
0.0272
0.3153

Standard
Deviation
0.1550
2.0166
0.2510
0.2901
1.8954
0.0580
0.0760
0.4647

Statistics are calculated having winsorised all variables at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions

Table 3: Univariate Correlation Coefficients
tdta

lnta

tang

roa

mtb

capexta

resdev

tdta

1.00

lnta

0.34***

1.00

tang

0.38***

0.28***

1.00

roa

0.10***

0.39***

0.17***

1.00

mtb

-0.17***

-0.26***

-0.16***

-0.26***

1.00

capexta

0.13***

0.08***

0.533***

0.06***

0.05***

1.00

resdev

-0.19***

-0.20***

-0.18***

-0.38***

0.33***

-0.07***

1.00

resdevdum

-0.10***

-0.005

-0.14***

-0.12***

0.16***

-0.07***

0.53***

resdevdum

1.00

Coefficients estimated are Pearson correlation coefficients. *, ** and *** denote coefficient significance levels of p≤.01, p≤.05 and
p≤.1, respectively. Statistics are calculated having winsorised all variables at the 1% level at both ends of their distributions

Formulation of Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model
Assume that each firm has its own endogenously determined target leverage ratio, which is a
function of a set of observable lagged firm characteristics, as well as unobservable firmspecific time-invariant effects. This can be expressed as:
k

D *it 
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k

where D *it is the target leverage ratio of firm i at time t,



k

x kit 1

is a set of k firm

k 1

characteristics for firm i at time t-1,  i represents unobserved firm-specific time-invariant
effects, and uit is an error term. If firms are assumed to adjust their leverage ratios each
period such that the actual leverage ratio is as close as possible to the target leverage ratio for
that period, the change in the actual leverage ratio in a given time period can be expressed as:

Dit  Dit 1   ( D *it  Dit 1 )

(2)

where Dit is the actual leverage ratio in time t, Dit  Dit 1 is the change in actual leverage ratio
from time t-1 to t, D *it  Dit 1 is the required change in leverage ratio from time t-1 to t to
achieve the target leverage ratio, and  represents the fraction of the required change in the
leverage ratio actually achieved.
In the traditional static model the firm is assumed to always be at its optimum
leverage ratio, and thus the change in the leverage ratio in any period exactly equals the
required change, and hence λ = 1. If, however, firms are indifferent to their capital structures,
no target exists and any change in the leverage ratio is randomly associated with the
perceived required change, hence λ = 0. Finally, if firms do attempt to achieve an optimum
capital structure but are hindered by adjustment costs, the actual change will be a fraction of
the required change, and λ will lie between 0 and 1. λ therefore represents the speed at which
the firm adjusts to its target. Combining equations 1 and 2 above results in:
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Bringing all Dit 1 over to the RHS, multiplying out the terms in brackets, and factoring out

Dit 1 results in:

Dit  1   Dit 1  
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k 1

Thus, the model to be tested states that the leverage ratio of firm i in time t is a function of the
leverage ratio in time t-1, and a set of firm characteristics hypothesised to represent a firm’s
target leverage ratio in time t. In order to account for the fractional nature of the dependent
variable, we estimate equation 4 using the DPF estimator developed by Elsas and Floysiak
(2011). We also estimate the model using the System Generalised Methods of Moments
estimator as developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), as this is the most commonly employed
estimator when implementing a dynamic partial adjustment model, particularly when SOAs
are compared across sub-samples. Estimating both models allows us to demonstrate the scale
of the bias in the estimate of the SOA when estimators that do not address the fractional
nature of the dependent variable are employed to compare SOAs across sub-samples. For
both models we include time dummies to capture the effect of unobserved time-specific firminvariant fixed effects.

Sub-Sampling Method
In order to investigate heterogeneity in the SOAs of UK firms, we follow the approach of
Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015) and divide firms into sub-samples based on risk. Elsas and
Florysiak (2011) suggest that whilst riskier firms may exhibit slower speeds of adjustment
due to higher adjustment costs, they may also exhibit faster adjustment speeds due to higher
opportunity costs of being away from target leverage. Thus, estimating SOAs across subsamples that differ in terms of risk provides an opportunity to not only investigate
heterogeneity in SOAs, but also generate evidence in favour of one of two hypotheses that are
in direct contradiction.
To distinguish between high and low risk firms, we use three variables as categorising
mechanisms. First, as the cash flows of larger firms are likely to be less volatile due to greater
diversification of lines of business, we classify large firms as low risk and small firms as high
risk. Second, as the liquidation values of firms are likely to be directly related to the degree to
which their assets are tangible in nature, we classify firms with high proportions of tangible

assets as low risk and firms with low proportions of tangible assets as high risk. Finally,
given that firm size and asset tangibility may proxy firm characteristics other than risk, we
conduct exploratory factor analysis on all of our explanatory variables. We find that the
factor loadings of the first factor generated, and the only factor with an eigenvalue greater
than one, are positive in firm size, asset tangibility, profitability and capital expenditure, and
negative in market-to-book, research and development, and research and development
dummy. We assume this factor to represent risk i.e. firms that are larger, more profitable,
have higher levels of new and existing tangible assets, have fewer growth opportunities and
invest less in research and development pose lower risk to investors. We therefore estimate a
factor score for each observation, and classify firms with a high factor score as low risk and
firms with a low factor score as high risk.

IV.

Results

Table 4 presents the results of the dynamic partial adjustment model using the full sample of
firm-year observations. The Wald χ2 statistic for each model rejects the null hypothesis that
the coefficients of the explanatory variables are equal to zero, whilst the AR(2) and Hansen χ2
statistics relating to the BB model indicate, respectively, that second order serial correlation
is not present and that the set of instruments employed can be considered exogenous.
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables as generated by the DPF and BB
estimators imply SOAs of 27.9% and 20.9%, respectively, suggesting the average UK firm
does indeed adjust to a target leverage ratio. However, qualitatively speaking, the bias
associated with the BB estimator appears to be quite significant, as the DPF estimator is
approximately 33% faster in relative terms. This is consistent with the findings of Drobetz et
al (2015) who observe an SOA of 25% for the average firm in the G7 countries when
employing the DPF estimator, and a corresponding SOA of 18.2% when employing the BB
estimator. Furthermore, dropping firm-year observations with 0 leverage ratios appears to
have little or no impact in terms of reducing the bias associated with the BB estimator, as the
implied SOA using the sub-sample with positive leverage ratios is 20.2%. These results
suggest that SOAs estimated for UK firms in prior studies using the BB estimator may be
drawing spurious conclusions as to the true SOA of the average UK firm.
In relation to the determinants of target leverage, the coefficients for l.lnta, l.mtb and
l.capexta are consistent across the three models and with the existing literature, indicating

that larger firms with fewer growth opportunities and higher spending on fixed assets have
higher target leverage ratios as they pose less risk to lenders. The results relating to l.tang,
l.roa, l.resdev and l.resdevdum appear model dependent, with coefficient signs and
significance levels varying by estimator and sample. Why the coefficients for these variables
should differ across the models is not immediately apparent. Of particular interest are the
positive coefficients for l.roa and l.resdev as generated by the DPF estimator, as most studies
find negative coefficients for these variables. Perhaps more profitable firms have greater
access to debt markets due to increased ability to repay debt, whilst firms with significant
investment in R&D favour debt financing due to potential adverse selection costs associated
with equity issues.
Table 4: Results of the Dynamic Partial Adjustment Model – Full Sample
BB
DPF
BB
tdta>0
l.tdta
0.721***
0.791***
0.798***
(0.009)
(0.024)
(0.026)
l.lnta
0.010***
0.008***
0.006**
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
l.tang
-0.003
0.036**
0.018
(0.010)
(0.016)
(0.018)
l.roa
0.009**
0.008
0.008
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.009)
l.mtb
-0.002***
-0.002***
-0.003**
(0.0006)
(0.0008)
(0.001)
l.capexta
0.132***
0.102***
0.153***
(0.020)
(0.030)
(0.035)
l.resdev
0.049**
0.051*
-0.019
(0.024)
(0.030)
(0.050)
l.resdevdum
-0.004
-0.007
0.001
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.008)
N
Wald χ2(35)
Wald χ2(29)
AR(1)
AR(2)
Hansen χ2(303)

15,752
13961***

15,752

12,187

3245***
-15.36***
-0.07
314

36342***
-14.92***
0.49
288

Standard errors are in parentheses. . *, ** and *** denote coefficient significance levels of p≤.01, p≤.05 and p≤.1,
respectively.

To investigate the heterogeneity in SOAs across UK firms, table 5 presents SOAs
generated using sub-samples of firm-year observations. For the sake of brevity, only the
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) of the lagged dependent variable are
presented, along with the implied SOAs, the difference in SOAs across sub-samples, and a ztest statistic that indicates the extent to which SOAs can be considered significantly different
across sub-samples.4 All lagged coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The sub-samples
are generated using firm size, asset tangibility and a factor assumed to represent risk as
categorising variables. Panel A presents results for sub-samples with observations below and
above the sample median value of the relevant categorising variable. Panel B presents results
for sub-samples with observations below and above the sample 25th and 75th percentile values
of the relevant categorising variable, respectively.
A comparison of the SOAs across the three pairs of sub-samples in panel A
show that riskier firms adjust to target leverage ratios faster than less risky firms. These
results are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015) and suggest that riskier
firms face higher opportunity costs of deviating from target leverage, and thus have a greater
incentive to adjust to target leverage. In addition, the larger disparities across the sub-sample
SOAs as generated by the BB estimator demonstrate support for Elsas and Florysiak’s (2015)
assertion, that when assessing heterogeneity of SOAs, a biased estimator may lead to
spurious inferences being made. Indeed, panel B demonstrates that this bias can lead to
increasingly unreliable results being generated as ever more extreme sub-samples are
compared. The disparities between the sub-sample SOAs as generated by the BB model
become larger and statistically more significant in panel B, whilst those relating to the DPF
model become smaller and statistically less significant across the asset tangibility subsamples and risk factor sub-samples. As such, the SOAs generated by the DPF model in
panels A and B suggest the relationship between SOA and firm size may be monotonic,
whilst those between SOA and asset tangibility, and SOA and risk factor, may be nonmonotonic. On the other hand, the SOAs generated by the BB model suggest all three
relationships are monotonic. These results are again comparable to those presented by Elsas

1

The z test statistic is calculated as follows: z 

1   2
se12  se 22

, where 1 and  2 are the coefficients of the

lagged dependent variable within each sub-sample pairing, and se 1 and se 2 are the associated standard
errors.

and Florysiak (2015), where the patterns of SOAs generated by the DPF and BB models
across sub-samples based on credit ratings differ significantly.

Categorising
Variable
Panel A

Table 5: SOAs across Risk Sub-Samples
DPF
Diff
Sub-Sample
l.tdta
SOA
l.tdta
z-test
Small

Firm Size
Large
Asset
Tangibility

Low
Tangibility
High
Tangibility
High Risk

Risk Factor
Low Risk

0.712
(0.016)
0.763
(0.014)
0.704
(0.015)
0.745
(0.013)
0.714
(0.016)
0.764
(0.013)

0.288
0.237
0.296
0.255
0.286
0.236

0.051
2.40**

0.041
2.07**

0.050
2.43**

0.765
(0.035)
0.849
(0.029)
0.726
(0.034)
0.809
(0.030)
0.735
(0.029)
0.825
(0.027)

BB
SOA

0.235
0.151
0.274
0.191
0.265
0.175

Diff
z-test

0.084
1.85*

0.083
1.83*

0.090
2.27**

Panel B
Very Small
Firm Size
Very Large
Asset
Tangibility

Risk Factor

V.

Very Low
Tangibility
Very High
Tangibility
Very High
Risk
Very Low
Risk

0.678
(0.026)
0.770
(0.017)
0.732
(0.025)
0.747
(0.019)
0.712
(0.028)
0.758
(0.019)

0.322
0.230
0.268
0.253
0.288
0.242

0.092
2.96***

0.015
0.48

0.046
1.36

0.664
(0.046)
0.790
(0.031)
0.599
(0.051)
0.854
(0.032)
0.654
(0.054)
0.847
(0.029)

0.336
0.210
0.401
0.146
0.346
0.153

0.126
2.27**

0.255
4.24***

0.193
3.15***

Conclusion

This study investigates heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment (SOA) to target leverage in
UK firms. Using the Dynamic Panel Fractional estimator which accounts for the censored
nature of leverage, we find that a firm’s SOA to target leverage is dependent on the level of
risk it poses to investors. High risk firms are observed to adjust to target leverage at a faster
rate than low risk firms, suggesting that the opportunity cost of deviation from target leverage
is higher for riskier firms. We also demonstrate that SOAs estimated using the Blundell-Bond
(BB) estimator, which does not account for the censored nature of leverage, produces

markedly different SOAs, both when the full sample of observations is employed, and when
SOAs are estimated across sub-samples of observations. These findings suggest that SOAs
reported by studies using the BB estimator are likely biased, particularly in relation to SOAs
generated using sub-samples. Our results are consistent with those of Elsas and Florysiak
(2011, 2015) and Drobetz et al (2015), and demonstrate the need to address both
heterogeneity in SOAs and the fractional nature of leverage when estimating SOAs in a
dynamic partial adjustment setting.
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